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1 INTRODUCTION
Organizations very often confront situations in which it is important that a common action is chosen by its
members: selecting a candidate for a job opening, a programming language in a project, or a location for a
new office building. Yet, the preferences about those actions are not in general common knowledge (who is
the preferred job market candidate for each member of the organization: the search theorist, or the trade
economist?). One possible solution in this context is to foster communication and “transparency” to achieve
the desired coordination. Executives and managers are often recommended to improve communication
(Smidts et al, 2001; Eisenberg and Witten, 1987), encouraged to perform 360 degree reviews (Yammarino
and Atwater, 1997; Atwater and Waldman, 1998), and generally told to facilitate “making the views of all
stakeholders heard” (Scholes and Clutterbuck, 1998; Morsing and Schultz, 2006).
The purpose of our research is to test the hypothesis that improved communication is always efficiency
enhancing within organizations. In order to do this, we design a simple strategic game of coordination with
private information, and test in a laboratory experiment whether two-way communication is superior to
one-way communication.
To be more specific, the participants in our experiment play a two-player game where each of them has
two actions, that we call X and Y . It is common knowledge that taking different actions leads to the worst
payoff, and that player 1 prefers the outcome achieved with the profile (X,X) and player 2 prefers that with
(Y, Y ). But the payoff for the player from her less profitable outcome is her private information, and can
take one of two values v ∈ {A,B} with A < B. Efficiency, or at least total surplus maximization, suggests
that the partner should choose the profile with the lower loss for the “damaged” player. But choosing the
efficient option is difficult because whether vi is the low (A) or the high (B) value is private information of
the player.
In our experiment, the X and Y actions are chosen only after some communication ensues. The partic-
ipants can choose a message from A and B, before choosing actions. There are three treatments. In one
of them there is no communication, the participants just choose actions. The other two treatments have
communication. In one of those treatments, only one (randomly chosen) player can send a message. In the
other treatment with communication, both players choose a message simultaneously. After the player(s)
send the message(s), both players choose actions.
There are at least two possible benchmarks against which we can compare our experimental results. First,
we can compute the most informative symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium with purely self-interested and
consequentialist players, who only care about their own final payoffs and are Bayes rational. We will call
this the standard prediction. One potential alternative assumes that it is common knowledge that players
always send truthful messages and otherwise they are standard Bayes rational and self-interested. We will
call this the truthful prediction.
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Under two-way communication, these two predictions coincide (as proved in Ganguly and Ray, 2017).
The most informative symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the game posits that both players announce
their types truthfully. If the two announced types do not coincide, the players then play the actions leading
to the efficient outcome; when the two players announce the same type, the players use the symmetric (and
thus mixed) equilibrium in the corresponding subform.
Under one-way communication the two predictions diverge. The truthful prediction states that the player
who sends the message announces her type truthfully. The players then play the actions corresponding to
an equilibrium of the Bayesian game in which the type of the sender is common knowledge and that of the
receiver is private information. The standard prediction, on the other hand, is that the players either babble
at the communication stage, by sending the same (possibly mixed) uninformative message, or they choose
the same action at the action stage. That is, in equilibrium one of two things will happen. One is that the
messages are independent of the players’ types and then at the action stage, they play the Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium of the game without communication. The other is that the players’ actions are independent of
their messages, even if the messages are true reports.
The results of our experiment are, in essence, as follows. In the game with two-way communication the
common standard and truthful prediction hold remarkably well. Both players tell the truth a very large
fraction of the time and, conditional on truth-telling, the subsequent behavior is also very much in line with
the prediction.
On the other hand, in the game with one-way communication, the observed play is statistically in line
with the truthful prediction. By and large, senders tell the truth, and receivers act accordingly. Thus, the
standard prediction is clearly rejected. Players do not use the same message, and they do not ignore the
sender’s message after communicating.
An important implication of our observations is that aggregate payoffs are significantly larger under
one-way communication than that under two-way communication, and both of them are higher than that
without communication. This is in stark contrast with both the standard prediction and the previous exper-
imental research on cheap-talk games under complete information. Since reality is fraught with information
asymmetries, our results are thus very significant because of its implications. A policy of unrestrained com-
munication and transparency might not always be in the organization’s best interest, although clearly some
communication is necessary.
Note that our results are obtained in a one-shot game, where there is no chance of establishing a reputation
for reliability and trustworthiness. We expect the results to be even stronger in the context of a long-lived
organization where the actors have an incentive to establish themselves as trustworthy partners (Wilson and
Sell 1997).
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1.1 Related literature
Many games of economic interest involve multiple (pure) Nash equilibria and it is therefore important
to understand how, if at all, players coordinate to play a particular equilibrium outcome. This problem
of equilibrium selection has been theoretically analyzed using different criteria, such as, payoff-dominance
(Colman and Bacharach, 1997), or risk-dominance (see Harsanyi and Selten, 1988, and Straub, 1995 for
experimental evidence).
The experimental literature shows that in coordination games with multiple equilibria, players often
fail to coordinate (Van Huyck et al, 1991; Cooper and John, 1988; Straub, 1995) unless the game has
special features, such as a very strong kind of risk-dominance (Cabrales et al, 2000). It is also well-known
since the work by Cooper et al (1989) that cheap-talk (Farrell, 1987) and in general, pre-play non-binding
communication can significantly improve coordination in experiments with games like Battle of the Sexes
(see Crawford, 1998; Costa-Gomes, 2002; Burton et al, 2005, for details). In contrast with the previous
literature1, we concentrate on games with private information. These games are very realistic in many
contexts, and the coordination potential of communication is severely threatened in them because of the
incentive problems of the players.
There is little evidence on coordination with incomplete information; most of it concentrates on the effect
of adding public information about a common state (McKelvey and Page, 1990; Marimon and Sunder, 1993;
McCabe et al, 2000; Heinemann et al, 2004; Cabrales et al, 2007) in the spirit of global games (Carlsson
and Van Damme, 1993; Morris and Shin, 1998) and on the effect of sunspots (Duffy and Fisher, 2005). Our
experiment concentrates on the problem of coordination when the incomplete information is about private,
not common, values.
A different strand of experimental literature concentrates on analyzing the sender-receiver games a` la
Crawford and Sobel (1982). In these games, coordinating actions is not a problem (unlike our case), since
only the receiver takes an action, after the sender’s message; however, there is still multiplicity of equilibria
arising from the existence of equilibria where the messages are ignored (“babbling equilibria”). One main
result in that literature (e.g., Dickhaut et al, 1995; Blume et al, 1998, 2001; Kawagoe and Takizawa, 1999)
is that the players tend to behave as in the informative equilibrium when their interests are well-aligned.
Our game is one where the players’ interests do not coincide, and thus we are closer to another strand
of the literature (Sa´nchez-Page´s and Vorsatz, 2007; Kawagoe and Takizawa, 2005; Cai and Wang, 2006;
Wang et al, 2010) dealing with games where the players’ interests do not coincide. They tend to find that
in games where interests do not align well, the senders sometimes tell the truth even when this is not in
1Some other literature has shown experimentally that communication and recommendations of play can serve to achieve
correlated equilibria (Moreno and Wooders, 1998; Cason and Sharma, 2007; Duffy and Feltovich, 2010; Bone et al, 2013; Anbarci
et al, 2017; Duffy et al, 2017; Georgalos et al, 2017) a la Aumann (1974, 1987).
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equilibrium. This finding can be explained by a truth-telling norm. An exception to the above is Cabrales
et al (2016), who also find some evidence of aversion to lying, but in addition a substantial amount of
deception/misinformation even when lying does not increase the sender’s payoff. This happens more often
for the subjects who display non-pro-social or envious preferences, which they measure independently. These
results are important for our paper, because in our context, there is also a tension between truth-telling norms
and fairness preferences, which in our case seems to be resolved in favor of the truth-telling norm. This is
likely because of repetition, since the participants are not always on the “losing” side of the coordination
game.
2 MODEL
The subsections below present the theoretical concepts behind our experiment as discussed in the next
section.
2.1 Game
We consider the following two-person Bayesian game in which each player has two pure strategies, namely,
X and Y :
1\2 X Y
X 1, v2 0, 0
Y 0, 0 v1, 1
Table 1: Battle of the Sexes with private information
where vi’s are independent random variables taking two values, {A,B} with A < B with p being the
probability of B; vi is private information for player i, i = 1, 2. Players get a positive payoff only when they
coordinate their strategies either on X or Y .
We study an extended game in which the players are first allowed to have a round of simultaneous cheap
talk, where they may reveal their private information about the value of vi, before they play the above
Battle of the Sexes (henceforth, BoS). The typical set-up is a three-stage game where, if the communication
is two-way:
1. Nature tells players the value of vi,
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2. Players simultaneously report a value of vi from the feasible set, {A,B},
3. Players choose X or Y ;
and if communication is one-way, the game is as above except that in stage 2 only one player reports her
type.
At the end of the game, payoffs are realized according to Table 1, based on the realized values of vi’s.
In the first (cheap talk) stage of this game, an announcement strategy for player i is thus a function
ai : {A,B} → ∆({A,B}), where ∆({A,B}) is the set of probability distributions over {A,B}. With some
abuse of notation, one may write ai(B |vi ) for the probability that strategy ai(vi) of player i with valuation
vi assigns to the announcement B.
For the two-way communication game, in the second (action) stage, a strategy for player i is a function
σi : {A,B} × {A,B} × {A,B} → ∆({X,Y }), where ∆({X,Y }) is the set of probability distributions over
{X,Y }. We write σi(X |vi; τ1, τ2 ) for the probability that strategy σi(vi; τ1, τ2) of player i with valuation
vi assigns to the action X when the first stage announcements are (τ1, τ2). Similarly, for the one-way
communication game, such a strategy of player i with valuation vi will be σi(vi; τ) that assigns probability
to the action X when the first stage announcement is τ .
2.2 Theoretical Benchmark
Ganguly and Ray (2017) showed that there exists a unique fully revealing symmetric perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of this two-way communication game for a range of values of p. In that equilibrium, called
Sseparating, the players announce their types truthfully, that is, ai(B |B ) = 1 and ai(B |A ) = 0, for i =
1, 2. Then, in the action stage, when both players’ types are identical, each player plays the mixed Nash
equilibrium strategies of the complete information BoS (in which player 1 plays X with probability 1/ (1 + v2)
and player 2 plays Y with probability 1/ (1 + v1)); and when only player 1’s value is B (A) they play the
coordinated outcome (Y, Y ) ((X,X)) . Theorem 1 in Ganguly and Ray (2017) confirms that Sseparating is
the unique fully revealing symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium and it exists only for
A2 +A2B
1 +A+A2 +A2B
≤ p ≤ AB +AB
2
1 +A+AB +AB2
. (1)
One may also be interested in knowing what happens in the corresponding game with one-way commu-
nication. In particular, we want to know whether any truthful equilibrium exists in this case or not. As the
game is now asymmetric (as only one of the players is talking), we cannot resort to symmetry any further.
It can be easily shown that there are multiple asymmetric equilibria. Players may babble at the cheap-talk
stage, that is, they may report the same value (or distribution over values) regardless of the original value
and then play any of the equilibria of the BoS.
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Truthfully revealed messages followed by actions that depend meaningfully on the messages are no longer
equilibrium profiles when only one player (say, player 1) talks. More formally, in the game with one-way
cheap talk (say, by player 1), an action profile is called non-babbling if at least one of the following conditions
holds: (i) σ1(X |B;B ) 6= σ1(X |A;A ), (ii) σ2(X |B;B ) 6= σ2(X |B;A ), (iii) σ2(X |A;B ) 6= σ2(X |A;A ), that
is, if at least one type of one player chooses a different action. There does not exist an equilibrium in this
game with such a non-babbling strategy profile where player 1 reports his type truthfully in the cheap talk
stage (Theorem 4 in Ganguly and Ray, 2017).
2.3 Parameters
We now focus our attention on specific values of the parameters (the private values) in the BoS presented
in Table 1, to be used in our experimental analysis. Since we would like to test for the validity of the
fully revealing symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium, Sseparating, in the two-way communication game, we
choose values of A, B such that condition 1 is respected. In particular, a pair that works well is A = 0.65
and B = 0.9, with p = 0.4.
A remark is in order regarding our choice of values. These values of A and B are chosen because we
want the low coordination payoff at state A to be sufficiently different from that at B so that the surplus
difference is significant. Moreover, we know that the upper bound of p in 1 is such that p < 0.5. We would
like the states (A,B) and (B,A) to happen sufficiently often because these are the states when there can be
coordination in an outcome that does not maximize surplus. The combined probability of these states with
our choice of p turns out to be 2p (1− p) = 0.48 which we think is sufficiently large for our purposes.
In the rest of the paper, we call a player of High-type when vi. = 0.9 and of Low-type when vi. = 0.65.
As a short-hand, four possible type profiles or four possible states will also be denoted by AA, AB, BA and
BB, respectively. The game therefore can be presented in four different type-profiles as in Table 2 below.
Both Players: High-types (AA state) Player 1: High-type, Player 2: Low-type (BA)
X Y
X 1, 0.9 0, 0
Y 0, 0 0.9, 1
X Y
X 1, 0.65 0, 0
Y 0, 0 0.9, 1
Player 1: Low-type, Player 2: High-type (AB) Both Players: Low-types (BB)
X Y
X 1, 0.9 0, 0
Y 0, 0 0.65, 1
X Y
X 1, 0.65 0, 0
Y 0, 0 0.65, 1
Table 2: The Bayesian game with two types for each player
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One may check that, for these parameter values, when the players follow the equilibrium strategy
Sseparating, they coordinate on (Y, Y ) ((X,X)) when only player 1’s value is B (A) and they play the
mixed Nash equilibrium when both players’ types are identical. This means that in the BB state, player
1 plays X with probability 10/19 (' 0.53) and by symmetry, player 2 plays Y with probability 10/19. In
the AA state, player 1 plays X (and player 2 plays Y ) with probability 20/33 (' 0.61) . Thus, Sseparating
generates the following distribution (as shown in Table 3) over the outcomes, with the (expected) payoff for
each player being 17598/26125 (' 0.67).
X Y X Y X Y X Y
X 90361
100
361 X 0 0 X 1 0 X
260
1089
400
1089
Y 81361
90
361 Y 0 1 Y 0 0 Y
169
1089
260
1089
Types: BB Types: BA Types: AB Types: AA
Table 3: The two-way cheap-talk equilibrium distribution
Note that, as is evident from Table 3, this equilibrium, Sseparating, generates a fair amount of miscoor-
dination only when the types are the same, as the players mix in these states.
One can also compare the cheap-talk equilibrium Sseparating with the unique symmetric Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium of the BoS with no communication.
Remark 1 Given our parameter values, it is easy to verify (see Proposition 1 in Ganguly and Ray, 2017
for details), as A/ (1 +A) (' 0.39) ≤ p (= 0.4) ≤ B/ (1 +B) (' 0.47), that in the unique Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium of that game, player 1 Low-type plays the pure strategy X and High-type plays Y (by symmetry,
player 2 Low-type plays Y and High-type plays X). Thus, in this (pure) Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, the
players fully coordinate when their types are different; however, they completely miscoordinate when their
types are the same. The expected payoff for each player in this equilibrium therefore is 0.456.
2.4 Reduced Games
The original Bayesian game, as in Table 2, can be reduced if we assume that one of the players is revealing the
type truthfully. In such a case, we will have a reduced (Bayesian) game with one-sided private information,
in which one of the players will have two types. For example, consider the case where player 1 truthfully
reports to be of High-type; then the reduced game will have two types (High and Low) for player 2 only, as
shown in Table 4 below.
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Player 2: High-type Player 2: Low-type
X Y
X 1, 0.9 0, 0
Y 0, 0 0.9, 1
X Y
X 1, 0.65 0, 0
Y 0, 0 0.9, 1
Table 4: The reduced Bayesian game with player 1 as High-type
For the above Bayesian game, one may easily find strategy profiles involving a strategy of player 1 and
strategies of player 2 for different types that form a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Not surprisingly, this game
has multiple equilibria. It is indeed easy to check that the profiles (X;X,X) and (Y ;Y, Y ) are both (pure)
Bayesian-Nash equilibria. Moreover, one may prove that the mixed strategy profile given by ( 2033X;
7
57X,X) in
which player 1 plays X with probability 2033 (Y with
13
33 ) and player 2 with Low-type plays X with probability
7
57 (Y with
50
57 ) while High-type plays the pure strategy X is also a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of this game.
Similarly, when player 1 is of Low-type, then one may show that the set of equilibria for the corresponding
reduced Bayesian game (with player 1 as Low-type and player 2 with two possible types, Low and High)
consists of the pure profiles (X;X,X) and (Y ;Y, Y ) and the mixed profile given by (1019X;Y,
65
66X), in which
player 1 plays X with probability 1019 (Y with
9
19 ) and player 2 with Low-type plays pure strategy Y while
High-type plays the X with probability 6566 (Y with
1
66 ).
By symmetry, using the above analysis, one can also easily find the corresponding sets of equilibrium
profiles for two other reduced games in which player 2 is of a given specific type (High or Low) but player 1
has private information, with two types (High and Low).
3 EXPERIMENT
As explained in the Introduction, we focus on the truthful equilibrium play in the two-way communication
and the truthful play in the one-way communication. We are particularly interested in the differences, if
any, in the payoffs obtained in these games by the participants in our experiments. Our experimental design
is guided by this agenda.
3.1 Design and Procedures
As already mentioned in the previous section, we use the version of 2 x 2 game of BoS with private information
presented in Table 2.
We have a 3 x 2 experimental design. In total, we have six experimental treatments that can be divided
into two categories: direct and strategy method. Within each category, there are three treatment subgroups.
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These treatments differ in the communication possibilities: two-way communication, one-way communication
and no communication.
Our experiment comprises 9 sessions involving a total of 216 subjects. For the direct method, in each of
our treatments, we ran two sessions with 24 subjects; in total, 144 students participated in 6 sessions. For
the strategy method, we ran one session with 24 subjects per treatment; hence, 72 subjects participated in
these sessions.
We used a “between subjects” design, where each participant took part in only one session and thus
only in one treatment. For each of the sessions, we used 3 matching groups, each comprising 8 subjects
(i.e., 4 pairs) in order to increase the number of independent observations. Each of these matching groups
represents an independent observation; hence, we have 6 and 3 independent observations per treatment for
the direct method and the strategy method respectively.
Each treatment lasted for 20 rounds. We randomly re-matched the subjects in every round in order
to create an environment as close as possible to a one-period interaction between subjects. Subjects were
informed that they had been randomly paired with participants; however, they were not aware of the identity
of the subjects they were matched with. The same matching protocol was used in all matching groups. In
this paper, all our non-parametric tests are based on matching group averages of the relevant variables for
each treatment.
The overview of the experimental design is summarized in Table 5 below. Note that in the strategy
method, all subjects choose what they would do if they were of Low or High type; hence, the total number of
elicited observations with both Low and High type is equal to 480, however the actual observed frequencies
are lower.
Method Treatment #Subjects #Ind. Obs. #Periods #Realized Obs. #Realized Obs.
(Comm.) (Low Type) (High Type)
Direct Two-way 48 6 20 576 384
One-way 48 6 20 576 384
None 48 6 20 576 384
Strategy Two-way 24 3 20 288 192
One-way 24 3 20 288 192
None 24 3 20 288 192
Table 5: Summary of the experimental design
All sessions used an identical protocol. At the beginning of a session, subjects were seated and given a
set of written instructions (see Appendix 2). The subjects were first informed that all participants in the
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session had identical instructions and were given five minutes to read the written instructions. Then, they
were given a few minutes to complete a brief comprehension test (see Appendix 2), to ensure that they had
understood the instructions. When the subjects had done the test, we went around to them individually to
make sure that they had all the answers correct. The experiment did not proceed until every subject had the
correct answers to these questions. Subjects were not allowed to communicate with one another throughout
the session, except via the decisions they made during the experiment.
At the beginning of a round, subjects were shown the payoff matrix corresponding to the game and the
value of vi (A or B). For any treatment, in all its sessions, we used the same random sequence of values to
reduce across-subject variation. After the subjects decided which action to choose, they were provided with
the feedback on their own announcement (depending on the treatment), own chosen action, counterpart’s
announcement (depending on the treatment), counterpart’s chosen action, own payoff and counterpart’s
payoff, after each round. Subjects were not presented a history of the game, however they were given a
record sheet in which they may be able to save their previous decisions as well as the decisions of their
counterparts and their own payoffs (see Appendix 2 for details).
At the end of round 20, the experimental session ended. Subjects were asked to complete a brief on-screen
questionnaire with some supplementary private (anonymous) information and then privately paid according
to their point earnings from all 20 rounds. We used an exchange rate of £1 per point, which allowed us to
align the incentives of the subjects with the monetary gain in a clear manner. Sessions lasted, on average, for
45 minutes. The average payment over all treatments was about £11 (approximately $15) which is higher
than student jobs in the UK that offer about £7.00 per hour.
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). All the
sessions for the direct method were conducted at the laboratory of the Centre for Experimental Economics
(EXEC) at the University of York while the sessions for the strategy method were conducted at the Economic
Learning and Social Evolution (ELSE) at the University College London. The subjects were recruited, using
the ORSEE software (Greiner, 2015), from various fields of studies, including, but certainly not confined to,
Economics or other Social Sciences, of the University of York and University College London, respectively
for the direct and the strategy method parts of the experiment.
3.2 Hypotheses
In this subsection, we formally present our theoretical hypotheses, following the discussion in the Introduction
and the formal set-up in Section 2.
As noted earlier, we have chosen our parameters (probabilities and payoffs in the game) so that the
truthful equilibrium exists in two-way communication. We expect to observe the equilibrium in two-way
communication. However, we believe that the individuals will report their values truthfully in the communi-
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cation stage regardless of the treatment (one-way or two-way), even though it is not part of an equilibrium to
report the type truthfully in the one-way communication game. Thus, our first null hypothesis is as below.
Hypothesis 1 Individuals truthfully report their values in the communication stage in both the two-way and
the one-way treatments.
Hypothesis 1 implies that we do not expect any difference in truth-telling between the two types of players
within a given game and between the two (one-way and two-way) communication treatments.
Our main hypothesis regarding the players’ behavior in the two-way communication treatment is straight-
forward: we believe that the players do follow the equilibrium strategy Sseparating in the game with two-way
communication.
Hypothesis 2 Players follow the fully revealing symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium strategy, that is,
they report their values truthfully and then choose the actions in Sseparating in the two-way communi-
cation treatment.
Note that, under Hypothesis 2, the outcomes in the game are as in Table 3.
We now focus on one-way communication and hypothesize the expected outcome in this treatment.
Given Hypothesis 1, the announcer’s report in the communication stage can be treated as her true type.
Therefore, the game is reduced to one in which only one player has private information, such as the one
described in Table 4 (in which player 2 has two types). As explained earlier, such a game has multiple
(Bayesian-Nash) equilibria. We hypothesize a natural selection from the set of equilibria in such a reduced
game. First, we think that the selected equilibrium will be the one where there is coordination, which is
desirable and thereby acceptable for both players. We further believe that coordination will occur in the
favorite equilibrium of the announcer. That is, if the announcer is a row (column) player of Low-type, the
choices will be (X,X) ((Y, Y )) and when she is of High-type, the choices will be (Y, Y ) ((X,X)). We pose
this as our next hypothesis formally.
Hypothesis 3 In the one-way communication treatment, if the row (column) player truthfully announces
the low value, 0 .65 , then the players coordinate of the equilibrium strategy profile (X;X,X) ((Y, Y ;Y )),
while the players coordinate of the equilibrium strategy profile (Y ;Y, Y ) ((X,X;X)) if the row (column)
player truthfully announces the high value, 0 .90 , in the corresponding reduced Bayesian game in which
only the column (row) player has private information with two types.
Our hypothesis regarding the players’ behavior in the no communication game is that the players follow
the unique Bayesian-Nash equilibrium strategy of the game as described in Remark 1.
Hypothesis 4 In the no communication treatment, the row (column) player plays the pure strategy X ( Y )
when the value vi is 0 .65 and the pure strategy Y ( X ) when the value vi is 0 .90 .
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One may easily calculate the expected payoff of a player from the chosen equilibria in different treatments
under our Hypotheses 2, 3 and 4. One may recall (from the previous section) that Sseparating generates an
expected payoff of 0.67 (approximately) for each player, whereas the expected payoff for each player from
the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the game (without communication) is 0.456. Hypothesis 3 suggests that
the players always get positive payoffs following the equilibrium selection using one-way communication. As
an announcer (the probability of which is 0.5), a player gets either 1 (with probability 0.6) or 0.9 (with
probability 0.4) while as a non-announcer, a player gets either 1 (with probability 0.4) or 0.65 (with joint
probability 0.36) or 0.9 (with joint probability 0.24); hence, the expected payoff of a player in the game
under Hypothesis 3 is 0.905.
This leads us to our final hypothesis regarding the level of coordination (measured by the sum of (X,X)
and (Y, Y )) and the payoffs achieved by the players in the game. Note that under Hypothesis 3 (coupled
with Hypothesis 1), the players fully coordinate on either (X,X) or (Y, Y ) equilibrium in the game, for all
type-profiles in the one-way treatment; however, in the two-way communication treatment, they do not fully
coordinate when their types are the same under Hypothesis 2, following the equilibrium strategy Sseparating,
and they completely miscoordinate in the no communication treatment when their types are the same, under
Hypothesis 4, following the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the game. Therefore, we believe that the level of
coordination and thus the payoffs are expected to be higher in the one-way treatment than those in the
two-way treatment which in turn be higher than those in no-communication. We pose this as our final, and
most important, hypothesis.
Hypothesis 5 Coordination on either (X,X) or (Y, Y ) equilibrium and thus the individual payoffs in the
game are the higher in the one-way communication than in the two-way communication treatment;
these in turn are higher in two-way communication than the no communication treatment.
Hypothesis 5 suggests that communication helps the players to achieve more coordination and payoffs;
however, it’s better to allow one-way communication.
We present our analysis of the experimental data and thereby test our hypotheses in the following section.
4 RESULTS
We divide our statistical analysis in different subsections below based on the hypotheses stated above. In
each of these subsections, we discuss our findings and the results from the direct method only; a similar
analysis for the strategy method is postponed to the Appendix.
13
4.1 Truthfulness
The first question that we are interested in is the truthfulness of the individuals while reporting their types
in the communication treatments. The issue here is whether individuals truthfully reveal their types during
the cheap talk phase. The short answer is yes. That is, individuals are indeed overall fairly truthful.
We do find that the proportion of truthful behavior is quite high. We can further split this answer
into categories by types (Low and High) and by treatments (two-way and one-way communication). Table
6 provides the proportion of truthful reports by all individuals (of two different types, as both row and
column players) in the two-way and the one-way communication treatments. For the one-way communication
treatment, naturally we have considered only the individuals who are the announcers (as either row or column
players).
Individual Truthfulness
Two-way Communication One-way Communication
Type Yes No Total Yes No Total
Low 45980%
117
20%
576
100%
240
82%
54
18%
294
100%
High 29076%
94
24%
384
100%
147
79%
39
21%
186
100%
Total 74978%
211
22%
960
100%
387
81%
93
19%
480
100%
Table 6: Truthfulness in all individual reports (by types and by treatments)
Table 6 shows that individuals are overall truthful (about 80% across types and communication treat-
ments); it also indicates that there is hardly any difference between two types and between two different
communication treatments.
One may look at the truthfulness within a pair in the two-way communication treatment. Using paired
data, we find that in 61% of the pairs, both individuals are truthful while in another 34% of pairs, one of
them is truthful.
We can also follow each individual over time and check how truthful she has been. First, in the two-way
treatment, we find that 11 (out of 48 individuals) are completely (100%) truthful which is also the modal
frequency in the corresponding frequency distribution of individual truthfulness. We also note that the
“median” individual is 85% truthful (25 out of 48 individuals report their true types in at least 17 rounds,
out of 20), as shown in the cumulative distribution in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Truthfulness among individuals in two-way communication
We find a very similar distribution for the one-way treatment, as shown in Figure 2; in this case, 13 (out
of 48 individuals) are completely (100%) truthful which also is the modal frequency and that the “median”
individual is 83% truthful.
Figure 2: Truthfulness among individuals in one-way communication
To see if there is any time-trend in truth-telling, one may look at the data in five-period blocks. Table
7 presents the frequencies (and the percentages) of reporting the true type, over 20 periods, divided into
four equal five-period blocks for two types of individuals separately in the two-way treatment indicating a
time-trend.2
2This trend can be shown to be significant using an appropriate regression analysis.
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Type Periods Frequency
1− 5 6− 10 11− 15 16− 20 Total
Low 102 out of 138 (74%) 128/168 (76%) 112/132 (85%) 117/138 (85%) 459/576 (80%)
High 76 out of 102 (75%) 53/72 (74%) 82/108 (76%) 79/102 (77%) 290/384 (76%)
Total 178 out of 240 (74%) 181/240 (75%) 194/240 (81%) 196/240 (82%) 749/960 (78%)
Table 7: Frequencies of truthfulness over period by types in two-way communication
We may now summarize the main finding of this subsection below.
Result 1 Individuals are overall truthful in reporting their types during the cheap talk phase, regardless of
their private values, in both one-way and two-way communication treatments; truth-telling increases
significantly over time.
Based on Result 1 above we can say that Hypothesis 1 (that the individuals are truthful in the cheap
talk phase) finds significant support in our data.
4.2 Equilibrium Play in Two-way Communication
In this subsection, we test our main equilibrium hypothesis (Hypothesis 2) for the two-way communication
treatment. As noted already, given our parameters, the fully revealing separating cheap talk equilibrium of
the game, Sseparating, does exist and is unique. As explained earlier, under this equilibrium, having truthfully
revealed their types, the players coordinate on the pure Nash equilibrium, (X,X) and (Y, Y ), respectively
in the AB and BA states; the equilibrium strategy in the AA state is given by: X (Y ) with probability
1/1.65 ' 0.61 for the row (column) player while for the BB state it is given by: X (Y ) with probability
1/1.9 ' 0.53 for the row (column) player.
We ask the question whether the individuals indeed played the equilibrium, Sseparating, in our two-way
communication treatment. We therefore look at what the individuals actually choose to play in the game
after reporting their types. Table 8 shows the choices made by the individuals in the game for the two-way
communication treatment. We present the data organized by individual truthfulness in this table as we have
already seen that individuals are mostly truthful.
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Truthful Value Counterpart’s Announcement Row Player Column Player
X Y Total X Y Total
Yes A A 8962%
55
38% 144
57
44%
73
56% 130
A B 8684%
16
16% 102
6
7%
77
93% 83
B A 45%
72
95% 76
65
79%
17
21% 82
B B 2435%
44
65% 68
27
42%
37
58% 64
No A A 1031%
22
69% 32
31
84%
6
16% 37
A B 1255%
10
45% 22
6
23%
20
77% 26
B A 947%
10
53% 19
19
58%
14
42% 33
B B 1694%
1
6% 17
5
20%
20
80% 25
Table 8: Choices made in the game by all individuals in two-way communication
Individuals appear to play the equilibrium strategy within Sseparating when they are truthful (from the
top half of Table 8). For example, having truthfully reported their own types, individuals of High-type as
the row player choose to play Y in 95% (72 out of 76) of the cases if the counterpart’s reported type is
Low (which may or may not be a true report); also, the truthful Low-type row player plays X in 62% cases
if the counterpart’s report is Low (compared to the theoretical equilibrium of 61%). These observations
are highlighted in Figure 3 that presents the frequencies of the choices by the individuals having truthfully
reported own type, compared to the corresponding equilibrium strategies.
Figure 3: Individuals’ choices following own truthful reports in two-way communication
To understand which factors affected the individuals’ choices in the game, we run a Probit regression
using 960 (48 x 20) individual observations from the 20 periods for the two-way communication treatment.
Our dependent variable here is a binary variable called Choice that takes value 1 if Y is chosen in the game
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and 0 otherwise. We use the independent variables: Player (takes value 1 if the individual is a column
player and 0 otherwise), Period (takes integer values from 1 to 20), Value (takes value 0 when the type
for any individual is Low, that is, the private value in the game is 0.65 and 1 when it is 0.90) and Truth
(takes value 1 when the reported type is the true type and 0 otherwise) and the variables Player*Period,
Player*Value that are products of the two named variables. We can report that the marginal effects of
the variables Player, Value and Player*Value are significant, indicating column players and High-types are
more likely to choose Y and, more importantly perhaps, column players with High-type (only case when the
variable Player*Value takes the value 1) are more likely to play X, something that is quite compatible with
our Hypothesis 2. This result is even more pronounced if we perform the same regression within the truthful
sub-sample (586 observations where both individuals are truthful) while dropping the independent variable
Truth, as shown in Table 9.
Dependent Variable: Choice = 1 if Y ; = 0 otherwise
Number of Observations: 586; Pseudo R2 = 0.1241
Independent Variables Marginal Effects Robust Standard Errors p-Values
Player 0.41∗∗∗ 0.09 0.000
Period 0.00 0.01 0.895
Player*Period −0.00 0.01 0.701
Value 0.47∗∗∗ 0.05 0.000
Player*Value −0.64∗∗∗ 0.04 0.000
Note: ∗ denotes significance at 10% level, ∗∗ at 5% level and ∗∗∗ at 1% level.
Table 9: Probit regression on choice in two-way communication for the truthful sub-sample
Another way of presenting the observation that the truthful individuals play to coordinate on (X,X) and
(Y, Y ), respectively in the AB and BA states is just to focus on the truthful subsample (when both players
are truthful in a pair), as Figure 4 demonstrates.
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Figure 4: Individuals’ play in two-way communication (within truthful pairs)
It is clear from Figure 4 that individuals play to coordinate on the desirable Nash outcome when their
types are different. For example, the second bar from the top shows that the High-type row player plays Y
in 95% cases when the counterpart is of Low-type.
We now test whether the observed distribution over the outcomes is the same as the theoretical equilibrium
distribution for all possible type profiles (as described in Table 3 earlier). To test this equilibrium hypothesis
(Hypothesis 2), we use a χ2-test with the null hypothesis that the observed distribution is indeed same as
the theoretical distribution. Table 10 reports the observed distributions under the truthful (where both
individuals are truthful) and non-truthful sub-samples and the results of the corresponding χ2-tests for
hypothesis testing.3
3These tests are done by pooling all observations for all subjects and all periods.
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Paired Types Outcomes χ2 p-Values
XX XY Y X Y Y Total
AA (Theoretical Equilibrium) 24% 37% 15% 24% 100%
AA (Both Truthful) 3429%
40
34%
17
14%
27
23%
118
100%
1.54
3 d.f. 0.674
AA (Not Truthful)∗∗∗ 2740%
18
26%
4
6%
19
28%
68
100%
13.24
3 d.f. 0.004
AB (Theoretical Equilibrium) 100% 0% 0% 0% 100%
AB (Both Truthful)∗ 4667%
9
13%
10
14%
4
6%
69
100%
7.67
3 d.f. 0.053
AB (Not Truthful)∗∗∗ 1124%
12
28%
11
24%
11
24%
45
100%
25.69
3 d.f. 0.000
BA (Theoretical Equilibrium) 0% 0% 0% 100% 100%
BA (Both Truthful) 00%
3
5%
3
5%
50
90%
56
100%
0.64
2 d.f. 0.725
BA (Not Truthful)∗∗∗ 721%
7
21%
8
23%
12
35%
34
100%
14.24
3 d.f. 0.002
BB (Theoretical Equilibrium) 25% 28% 22% 25% 100%
BB (Both Truthful) 918%
11
22%
13
26%
17
34%
50
100%
3.61
3 d.f. 0.307
BB (Not Truthful)∗ 922%
7
18%
7
18%
17
42%
40
100%
6.94
3 d.f. 0.074
Note: ∗ denotes significance at 10% level, ∗∗ at 5% level and ∗∗∗ at 1% level.
Table 10: Equilibrium predictions and experimental data for two-way communication
The statistical tests reported in Table 10 check whether our equilibrium predictions hold for the truthful
and the non-truthful samples for different type profiles (AA, AB, BA and BB). Based on the p-values, we
conclude that our experimental data significantly (at 1% level) differs from our equilibrium predictions in the
non-truthful samples, whereas for the truthful samples, our experimental data does not differ significantly
(at 5% level) from the equilibrium distributions.
We may now summarize the main finding of this subsection.
Result 2 Individuals’ choices in the two-way communication treatment are consistent with the equilibrium
strategy, when they are truthful in the cheap talk phase; the unique symmetric fully separating equilib-
rium outcome is observed in this treatment within the sub-sample when both players are truthful in the
cheap talk phase.
Based on Result 2 above, we find support for our main equilibrium Hypothesis 2. The fully revealing
separating cheap talk equilibrium is observed and the individuals play the equilibrium strategies in the game
when they report truthfully their types.
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4.3 Play in One-way Communication
We now present our results for the one-way communication treatment and thereby test our Hypothesis 3. To
do so, we look at the choices made by the players in the game, split into two parts, one for the announcers
and the other for the listeners. First, in Table 11, we present the frequencies of strategies played by the
announcer in the one-way treatment. Note that there is only one announcer in this treatment and thus the
total number of data analyzed here is 480.
Truthful Value Row Player Column Player
X Y Total X Y Total
Yes A 13387%
20
13%
153
100%
10
11%
77
89%
87
100%
B 1013%
67
87%
77
100%
61
87%
9
13%
70
100%
No A 1236%
21
64%
33
100%
12
57%
9
43%
21
100%
B 2184%
4
16%
25
100%
2
14%
12
86%
14
100%
Table 11: Choices made in the game by the announcers in one-way communication
The top half of Table 11 shows the behavior of a truthful announcer (in 387 out of 480 cases as reported
earlier in Table 6): as a row player, Low-type plays X (87%) and High-type plays Y (89%). Conversely, as
a column player, Low-type plays Y (89%) and High-type plays X (87%) which fits well with our hypothesis
of equilibrium selection for this treatment (as stated in Hypothesis 3). One may now consider the listeners’
choices to check the behavior as hypothesized in Hypothesis 3. Table 12 presents the listeners’ choices (by
type) following the announcements.
Own (Listener’s)
Counterpart’s (Announcer’s) Choice
Role Announcement Value X Y Total
Row A A 7970%
34
30% 113
B 5585%
10
15% 65
B A 35%
52
95% 55
B 611%
49
89% 55
Column A A 2441%
35
59% 59
B 1024%
32
76% 42
B A 4887%
7
13% 55
B 2775%
9
25% 36
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Table 12: Choices made in the game by the listeners in one-way communication
Table 12 shows that the choices made by the listeners are broadly in the direction of our Hypothesis 3.
For example, given that the row player announcement is A (taken as a true report), the listeners play X as a
column player regardless of their own types (70% and 85%) and when this announcement is B, the listeners,
play Y as a column player regardless of their own types (95% and 89%).
Tables 11 and 12 together indicate that following truthful announcements by the announcers, specific
equilibrium profiles of the corresponding reduced games are played as indicated in Hypothesis 3; for example,
having truthfully announced Low-type, a row player plays X and then the listener as a column player plays
X regardless of own type, resulting in the equilibrium strategy profile (X;X,X) in this reduced game.
We now present the actual outcomes of the game achieved in this treatment in Table 13.
Announcer’s Outcomes
Role Announcement Observations XX XY Y X Y Y Total
Row A All 9853%
47
25%
18
10%
23
12% 186
Truthful 9663%
37
24%
18
12%
2
1% 153
B All 1918%
12
12%
8
8%
63
62% 102
Truthful 11%
9
12%
6
8%
61
79% 77
Column A All 1413%
32
30%
8
7%
54
50% 108
Truthful 45%
27
31%
6
7%
50
57% 87
B All 5262%
11
13%
11
13%
10
12% 84
Truthful 5274%
8
12%
9
13%
1
1% 70
Table 13: Outcomes in the game in one-way communication
Table 13 indicates that following the truthful announcements, players coordinate on the pure Nash
equilibria of the game as suggested by our Hypothesis 3. The message of this section therefore is that
even though it’s not an equilibrium to play the truthful fully revealing profile in the one-way communication
treatment, players are indeed truthful and do play a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the corresponding reduced
game with one-sided private information. We may now summarize the main finding of this subsection below.
Result 3 In the one-way communication treatment, individuals play a particular Bayesian-Nash equilibrium
in the reduced game with one-sided private information, if the announcer is truthful. When the row
(column) player announces Low-type, the players play the strategy profile (X,X) ((Y, Y )), while the
players coordinate on (Y, Y ) ((X,X)) if the row (column) player announces the High-type.
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Based on Result 3 above we find evidence in favor of our Hypothesis 3 that players play a specific
Bayesian-Nash strategy profile in the one-way communication game.
4.4 Play without Communication
We now present our results for the no communication treatment and thereby test our Hypothesis 4. We
ask the question whether the individuals indeed played the unique Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the game
without communication. Table 14 shows the choices made by the individuals of different types in the game
for the no communication treatment.
Value Row Player Column Player
X Y Total X Y Total
A 21371%
87
29%
300
100%
107
39%
169
61%
276
100%
B 8949%
91
51%
180
100%
146
72%
58
28%
204
100%
Table 14: Choices made in the game in no communication
Table 14 does indicate that the Bayesian-Nash strategies are very weakly followed; for example, row
(column) players with Low (High) type play the pure strategy X in more than 71% cases which is in line
with the equilibrium (pure) strategy, however in all other cases the frequencies do not really match with the
corresponding equilibrium strategies.
We now test whether the observed distribution over the outcomes is the same as the theoretical equilibrium
distribution for all possible type profiles. To test this equilibrium hypothesis (Hypothesis 4), we use a χ2-test
with the null hypothesis that the observed distribution is indeed same as the theoretical distribution. Table
15 reports the observed distributions and the results of the corresponding χ2-tests for the hypothesis testing.
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Paired Types Outcomes χ2 p-Values
XX XY Y X Y Y Total
AA (Theoretical Equilibrium) 0% 100% 0% 0% 100%
AA (Observed)∗∗∗ 5630%
73
39%
19
10%
38
21%
186
100%
68.65
3 d.f. 0.000
AB (Theoretical Equilibrium) 100% 0% 0% 0% 100%
AB (Observed)∗∗∗ 6153%
23
20%
19
17%
11
10%
114
100%
24.64
3 d.f. 0.000
BA (Theoretical Equilibrium) 0% 0% 0% 100% 100%
BA (Observed)∗∗∗ 1719%
33
37%
15
16%
25
28%
90
100%
46.94
3 d.f. 0.000
BB (Theoretical Equilibrium) 0% 0% 100% 0% 100%
BB (Observed)∗∗∗ 2932%
10
11%
37
41%
14
16%
90
100%
31.21
3 d.f. 0.000
Note: ∗ denotes significance at 10% level, ∗∗ at 5% level and ∗∗∗ at 1% level.
Table 15: Equilibrium predictions and experimental data for no communication
The statistical tests reported in Table 15 check whether our equilibrium outcome predictions hold for
different type profiles (AA, AB, BA and BB). Based on the p-values, we conclude that our experimental
data significantly (at 1% level) differs from the predicted outcome distribution for all states.
We may now summarize the main finding of this subsection below.
Result 4 In the no communication treatment, the observed outcomes are different to those that would obtain
under the unique Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the game.
Based on the analysis in this subsection and Result 4, we unfortunately do not find strong evidence to
support our Hypothesis 4 that the players play the unique Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in the game without
communication. However, in some cases (such as, row (column) players with Low (High) type), players do
seem to play according to the equilibrium strategy.
Result 4 is in sharp contrast with the previous couple of results (Results 2 and 3) that suggest that the
players follow the equilibrium in games with communication. The following subsection exploits this contrast
even further.
4.5 Coordination and Payoffs
Having analyzed individuals’ truthfulness and strategies played in the one-way and two-way communication
games, we now focus on the payoffs in the game for different treatments. Obviously, payoffs are positively
correlated with the level of coordination on the Nash equilibrium outcomes ((X,X) and (Y, Y )) in the game.
Table 16 reports the frequencies of all outcomes chosen in the game. As we are interested in the cases where
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the individuals report their types truthfully, we also separately list the frequencies in the truthful sub-sample
(truthfulness refers to the announcer being truthful in the one-way treatment, and both individuals being
truthful for the two-way treatment).
TREATMENTS All Truthful
XX XY Y X Y Y Total XX XY Y X Y Y Total
Two-way 14330%
107
22%
73
15%
157
33%
480
100%
89
30%
63
22%
43
15%
98
33%
293
100%
One-way 18338%
102
22%
45
9%
150
31%
480
100%
153
40%
81
21%
39
10%
114
29%
387
100%
No Communication 16334%
139
29%
90
19%
88
18%
480
100% NA NA NA NA NA
Total 48934%
348
24%
208
14%
395
28%
1440
100%
242
36%
144
21%
82
12%
212
31%
680
100%
Table 16: Outcomes in the game in different treatments
Table 16 suggests that there is hardly any difference between the whole dataset and the truthful sub-
sample in terms of the frequencies of outcomes in the game. It also shows the level of coordination in the
game, as measured by the proportion of Nash equilibrium outcomes ((X,X) and (Y, Y )). We can see that
the percentage of coordination is highest in the one-way communication treatment (69%) followed by the
two-way treatment (63%), while the the percentage of coordination in the no communication treatment is
only 52%.
One may even look at the above frequencies split into five-period blocks. Figure 5 presents the percentages
of coordination ((X,X) and (Y, Y )), over 20 periods, divided into four equal five-period blocks for three
different treatments.
Figure 5: Frequencies (in percentages) of coordination over period blocks by treatments
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We now present the actual payoffs in the game in a similar way. Figure 6 below mimics Figure 5 and
shows the average payoffs for a pair (sum of payoffs for two players), over 20 periods, divided into four equal
five-period blocks for three different treatments.
Figure 6: Average payoffs for a pair of players in the game over period blocks by treatments
Naked eye observation of the above two figures reveals that there is a clear difference among the three
treatments. It also shows a time-trend for the two-way and the one-way treatments.4 We now focus on the
differences in payoffs among the treatments. A simple way of presenting the differences in payoffs among
the treatments is to plot the payoff levels from a rank-sum test for different treatments as shown in Figure
7 below. Given the time-trend shown above, we focus on periods 11− 20 only.
4This trend can be shown to be significant using a suitable regression analysis.
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Figure 7: Comparisons of average payoffs for a pair of players in the game by treatments
Figure 7 shows that the payoffs are highest in the one-way treatment. Formally, we use a Kruskal-Wallis
equality-of-populations rank test and find these three treatments are significantly different from each other
(p-value = 0.0051). Using the similar test for each pair of treatments, we also find that each pair is indeed
significantly different (at least at 10% level); the p-value for the comparison of no communication and one-
way is 0.0039, the corresponding p-value for no communication and two-way is 0.0374 and the p-value for
one-way and two-way is 0.0782. All these levels of significance are even stronger for periods 11− 20 only; for
example, the p−value in this case (periods 11− 20 only) for comparing one-way and two-way is now 0.0374,
indicating that the payoffs are higher in the one-way communication treatment than the two-way treatment.
We may now summarize the main finding of this subsection below.
Result 5 By using cheap talk individuals coordinate more in the game and thus achieve higher payoffs.
Coordination and payoffs increase over time and they are the highest in the one-way communication
treatment.
Based on Result 5 above, we accept our Hypothesis 5 that cheap talk helps the players to achieve more
coordination and thereby higher payoffs in the game. We also show that one-way communication achieves
the best results in this respect.
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5 Conclusion
We performed an experiment using a version of the Battle of the Sexes game with two-sided private informa-
tion. The main aim was to compare the outcomes when the game is played after either one-way or two-way
cheap talk, as well as with no communication. We find that the players are overall truthful about their
types in the cheap-talk phase in both one-way or two-way talk, something that is consistent with equilibrium
behavior for the two-way treatment, but is not under one-way communication. We find that payoffs are the
highest when the communication is one-way.
Clearly, this is an important result, as it suggests that maximum communication does not always enhance
efficiency under private information. It would be interesting to know the extent to which this is maintained
for other classes of games, for example, games where coordination is not the overarching driver of payoffs.
One important characteristic of our design is that the types of the participants in the experiment are not
fixed; they are sometimes high, and sometimes low. This could be helpful for them to accept an implicit
(non-equilibrium) truth-telling norm which leads to a socially desirable coordination. It sometimes goes
against their self-interest, but over the course of play they end up better off if everyone abides by the norm
of truth-telling. We suspect this would not be maintained if types were fixed and players were consistently
on a “losing” side of the coordination.
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6 APPENDIX 1: STRATEGY METHOD
As mentioned earlier, we ran three treatments (no communication, one-way communication and two-way
communication) using the strategy method as well. We report below the observations in the strategy method,
following the structure of the main paper on the direct method.
6.1 Truthfulness
Under the strategy method, in the two treatments with cheap talk (one-way and two-way), individuals report
their strategies as complete plans; first, they submit a plan of reported types based on their true types and
then they submit a plan of actions for the game. There are four possible plans of reporting, mapping from
two possible true types to two possible reported types, which we will denote by AA (reporting A when the
true type is Low and reporting A when the true type is High, that is, always reporting A regardless of the
true type), AB (the truthful strategy of reporting A when the true type is Low and reporting B when the
true type is High), BB (always reporting B regardless of the true type) and BA (reporting the opposite
of the true value for both types). Table 17 provides all individuals’ strategies in the two-way and one-way
communication treatments using the strategy method.
Strategies (Maps) AB (Truthful) AA BB BA Total
Two-way 28259%
86
18%
74
15%
38
8%
480
100%
One-way (Announcers only) 12954%
53
22%
42
17%
16
7%
240
100%
Table 17: Reporting strategies used by all individuals in the strategy method
We note from Table 17 that the truthful strategy has been used by majority of the individuals; however,
the observed proportion of truthful reports (plans, in this case) is lower than that in the direct method
(as shown in Table 6); also, we note that unlike the direct method (Table 6), individuals are slightly more
truthful in the two-way treatment than one-way. We can also report that in the two-way communication,
among all pairs, in only 33% (79 out of 240) pairs, both individuals used the truthful strategy (AB) which
is way below the corresponding observation (61%) in the direct method; however, in another 52% pairs, one
player is truthful.
To compare the individual truthfulness distribution with the corresponding distribution reported in Figure
1 for the direct method in the paper, we look at the individual data in the strategy method as well. We
notice that a huge proportion of individuals used one of the non-truthful strategies at least once. Here,
our data reveals that only 17% of the individuals used the truthful strategy (AB) in all the 20 periods in
the two-way communication treatment while 21% did so (in all 20 periods) in the one-way communication
treatment.
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One can also do a Probit regression here to understand the effects of different factors behind truthful
reporting; we find similar results as in the direct method.
6.2 Two-way Equilibrium
We first describe what the individuals have chosen in different hypothetical scenarios under the strategy
method. Table 18 is for the two-way communication treatment under the strategy method where each
individual makes conditional choices of X or Y for 8 possible situations as shown in Table 18. Here, the
states refer to the situations based on the individual’s type (value), own announcement and counterpart’s
announcement, respectively (see the instructions in Appendix 2). For example, the state AAA refer to the
situation when the individual is of Low-type (value A), reports (truthfully) Low-type (value A) while the
other player’s reported value is also A.
Situations States Row Player Column Player Total
X Y Total X Y Total
1 AAA 5276%
16
24%
68
100%
42
65%
23
35%
65
100% 133
2 AAB 3868%
18
32%
56
100%
7
23%
23
77%
30
100% 86
3 BBA 618%
27
82%
33
100%
19
46%
22
54%
41
100% 74
4 BBB 2160%
14
40%
35
100%
16
47%
18
53%
34
100% 69
5 ABA 1077%
3
23%
13
100%
9
31%
20
69%
29
100% 42
6 ABB 1185%
2
15%
13
100%
9
64%
5
36%
14
100% 27
7 BAA 450%
4
50%
8
100%
5
45%
6
55%
11
100% 19
8 BAB 1179%
3
21%
14
100%
10
63%
6
37%
16
100% 30
Total 153 87 240 117 123 240 480
Table 18: Choices of individuals in the two-way treatment under the strategy method
It is fairly straightforward to interpret the data reported in Table 18. We note, for example, row players
who are truthful of their High-types (value B), having received a reported value A from the counterpart,
plays Y in 82% of the cases, indicating the equilibrium behavior as mentioned in our Hypothesis 2, which is
similar to the corresponding observations in Table 8 for the direct method.
We produce now the frequencies of the observed outcomes for the strategy method in Table 19 below,
similar to those in Table 10.
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Paired Types Realized Outcomes
XX XY Y X Y Y Total
AA (Theoretical Equilibrium) 24% 37% 15% 24% 100%
AA (Both Realized Truthful) 3255%
11
19%
6
10%
9
16%
58
100%
AA (Not Truthful) 1131%
14
40%
1
3%
9
26%
35
100%
AB (Theoretical Equilibrium) 100% 0% 0% 0% 100%
AB (Both Realized Truthful) 1338%
9
27%
1
3%
11
32%
34
100%
AB (Not Truthful) 1043%
11
48%
0
0%
2
9%
23
100%
BA (Theoretical Equilibrium) 0% 0% 0% 100% 100%
BA (Both Realized Truthful) 15%
4
19%
3
14%
13
62%
21
100%
BA (Not Truthful) 937%
6
25%
4
17%
5
21%
24
100%
BB (Theoretical Equilibrium) 25% 28% 22% 25% 100%
BB (Both Realized Truthful) 832%
7
28%
4
16%
6
24%
25
100%
BB (Not Truthful) 630%
1
5%
8
40%
5
25%
20
100%
Table 19: Equilibrium predictions and experimental data for two-way communication under the strategy
method
6.3 One-way Play
We can report the data from the one-way treatment under the strategy method. Table 20 shows the choices
of the announcers in 4 possible scenarios based on own types and announcements; for example, the situation
AA refers to the state where the announcer is of Low-type (value A) and the announcement is A.
Situations States Row Player Column Player Total
X Y Total X Y Total
1 AA 11580%
29
20%
144
100%
51
53%
45
47%
96
100% 240
2 AB 7049%
74
51%
144
100%
43
45%
53
55%
96
100% 240
3 BA 8760%
57
40%
144
100%
58
60%
38
40%
96
100% 240
4 BB 7250%
72
50%
144
100%
53
55%
43
45%
96
100% 240
Total 344 232 205 179 960
Table 20: Choices of the announcers in the one-way treatment under the strategy method
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Table 21 shows the choices of the listeners in 4 possible scenarios based on own types and the announce-
ments (of the announcers); for example, the situation AA refers to the state where the listener is of Low-type
(value A) and the announcer’s announcement is A.
Situations States Row Player Column Player Total
X Y Total X Y Total
1 AA 4446%
52
54%
96
100%
101
70%
43
30%
144
100% 240
2 AB 6164%
35
36%
96
100%
41
28%
103
72%
144
100% 240
3 BA 2930%
67
70%
96
100%
103
72%
41
28%
144
100% 240
4 BB 6063%
36
37%
96
100%
67
47%
77
53%
144
100% 240
Total 194 190 312 264 960
Table 21: Choices of the listeners in the one-way treatment under the strategy method
6.4 No communication
We report the data from the no communication treatment under the strategy method. Table 22 shows the
individual choices for each of the two situations they may be in (based on their values).
Situations Values Row Player Column Player
X Y Total X Y Total
1 0.65 18778%
53
22%
240
100%
126
53%
114
47%
240
100%
2 0.90 14761%
93
39%
240
100%
167
70%
73
30%
240
100%
Table 22: Choices in the no communication treatment under the strategy method
We also report the frequencies of the observed outcomes in this no communication treatment in Table
23, which compares with Table 15.
Paired Types Outcomes
XX XY Y X Y Y Total
AA (Observed) 4144%
33
35%
9
10%
10
11%
93
100%
AB (Observed) 3358%
13
23%
9
16%
2
3%
57
100%
BA (Observed) 1431%
12
27%
11
24%
8
18%
45
100%
BB (Observed) 2249%
10
22%
10
22%
3
7%
45
100%
Total 110 68 39 23 240
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Table 23: Observed outcomes for the no communication treatment under the strategy method
6.5 Coordination
In the strategy method, individuals choose plans of reports and thereby what to play in the game in different
hypothetical situations. We consider the actual outcomes, from the realizations of the plans, in the strategy
method. Following Table 16 in the direct method, here as well we report the (realized) outcomes from all
observations and also from the truthful sub-sample (truthful in actual realizations - both truthful in the
two-way treatment) as shown in Table 24.
Treatments All Truthful
XX XY Y X Y Y Total XX XY Y X Y Y Total
Two-way 9038%
63
26%
27
11%
60
25%
240
100%
54
39%
31
23%
14
10%
39
28%
138
100%
One-way 10042%
55
23%
48
20%
37
15%
240
100%
74
42%
37
21%
38
22%
27
15%
176
100%
No Communication 11046%
68
28%
39
16%
23
10%
240
100% NA NA NA NA NA
Total 30042%
186
26%
114
16%
120
16%
720
100%
128
41%
68
22%
52
16%
66
21%
314
100%
Table 24: Outcomes (realized) in the strategy method
As in the direct method, here as well we take the proportion of Nash equilibrium outcomes ((X,X) and
(Y, Y )) as our measure of coordination. Table 25 below is derived from Table 24.
Treatments All Truthful
Coordination No Total Coordination No Total
Two-way 15063%
90
37%
240
100%
93
67%
45
33%
138
100%
One-way 13757%
103
43%
240
100%
101
57%
75
43%
176
100%
No Communication 13355%
107
45%
240
100% NA NA NA
Total 42058%
300
42%
720
100%
194
62%
120
38%
314
100%
Table 25: Coordination per treatment in the strategy method
From Table 25, we note, contrary to the direct method, the percentage of coordination (in realized
outcomes) is the highest in the two-way communication treatment followed by the one-way treatment.
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7 APPENDIX 2: INSTRUCTION MATERIALS
We report below the full set of instructions, the test and the record sheet only for the two-way treatment
of the direct method. The instructions (and the corresponding test and record sheet) for the one-way and
no-way treatments differ in a natural way; thus, for obvious reasons, these have been omitted here. For the
strategy method, we report just the instructions for the two-way treatment. The rest of the materials are
available upon request.
7.1 Instructions (Two-way; Direct Method)
All participants in this session have the following identical instructions.
Welcome to this experiment, and thank you for participating. From now onwards please do not talk to
any other participants until the experiment is finished.
You will be given five minutes to read these instructions. Then we will ask you to complete a brief test
to ensure that you have understood them, before starting the experiment itself.
YOUR DECISION PROBLEM
In this experiment you are asked to make a simple choice, in each of 20 successive rounds. In each round
you earn a number of points, as described below. The total number of points you accumulate over the 20
rounds determines your final money payment, at a conversion rate of 1 point = £1 (= 100 pence).
At the start of the first round, the computer randomly assigns you the role of either Player 1 or Player
2. You keep this same role throughout all 20 rounds.
But in each round you are randomly paired with another participant. So, if you are assigned the role of
Player 1, then the Player 2 who is paired with you in each round will probably be a different participant
from the Player 2 paired with you in earlier rounds. And likewise, if you are assigned the role of Player 2,
then the Player 1 paired with you in each round will probably be a different participant from the Player 1
paired with you in earlier rounds.
In each round, Player 1 and Player 2 each have to choose one of two alternatives, X and Y . You do so
independently of each other. So at the moment you make your own choice, you do not know the choice of
the other player.
YOUR EARNINGS
The two players’ choices together determine the points you each earn from that round, as described in
the following table.
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Player 2’s Choice
Player 1’s Choice
X Y
X 1, B 0, 0
Y 0, 0 A, 1
The first number in each cell indicates the points earned by Player 1, and the second number indicates
the points earned by Player 2.
In the above table, the number A is known to player 1 only; it is either 0.65 or 0.90. The probability of
the low value (0.65) is 60% while the probably of the high value (0.90) is 40%. Similarly, the number B is
known to player 2 only; it is either 0.65 or 0.90. Here as well, the probability of the low value (0.65) is 60%
while the probably of the high value (0.90) is 40%.
At the start of each round, the values of A and B are generated randomly and independently by the
computer.
The interpretation of the table is as follows:
If in some round, the choices made by the two players are different (XY or Y X), then both players get
0.
If in some round, both players choose X, then from that round Player 1 will earn 1 point (£1) while
Player 2 will earn either 0.65 (65p) or 0.90 (90p) which is known to Player 2 only.
If in some round both players choose Y , then from that round Player 2 will earn 1 point (£1) while
Player 1 will earn either 0.65 (65p) or 0.90 (90p) which is known to Player 1 only.
In each round, you and your counterpart are each informed of the respective values. You are informed
only of the value for you, and you don’t know your counterpart’s value, however, as mentioned, the chances
for your counterpart’s value being 0.65 (65p) or 0.90 (90p) are respectively 60% and 40%, regardless of your
own value.
YOUR ANNOUNCEMENT
After learning the value (and before making a choice), you and your counterpart both will be asked
to make an announcement regarding your respectively values. Each of you has two alternative values to
announce: 0.65 or 0.90.
It is entirely up to you, in any round, whether or not to announce your true value for that round. The
points that you will earn depend only on the choices made and the actual values, as described on the previous
page, irrespective of the announcements.
THE COMPUTER SCREEN
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The main screen for each round looks like this.
At the top of the screen there is a message which keeps count of the round, out of 20 (in this example,
Round 1). In the centre of the screen is the table which appears on the first page of these instructions.
Immediately below the table is a message informing you which role (Player 1 or 2) you have been assigned
(in this example, Player 1). This is the same in each round.
You know your value from the table (in this example, the value of Player 1 is A = 0.65); however, the
unknown value is indicated by “??” in the table (in this example, the value of Player 2, B, is unknown to
player 1 and is indicated by “??”).
Having seen your value form the table, you may make your announcement of a value of 0.65 or 0.90 by
selecting the appropriate button and then clicking on Submit.
You may then have to wait a few moments until all participants have made their announcements, after
which will appear the next screen for you (in this example, Player 1) as shown below.
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In this screen, you will be informed of your and your counterpart’s announced values (these may not be
the true values) below the description of the table and will be asked to make a choice. To make your choice
of X or Y , select the appropriate button and then click on Submit.
You may then have to wait a few moments until all participants have made their choices, after which the
results for you in that round will appear onscreen.
The result after each round includes information of the values for the both players, choices made by each
of the two players, and the points earned by each player (as below for example).
On your desk there is a Record Sheet on which you can keep a note of these results, if you wish to.
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After all the participants have read their results and clicked Continue, the main screen for the next round
will appear again as shown earlier.
AT THE END OF THE EXPERIMENT
When all 20 rounds have been completed, you will be asked to complete a brief onscreen questionnaire,
which provides useful supplementary (anonymous) information for us.
Having completed the questionnaire, you will see a final screen reporting your total points accumulated
over the 20 rounds and the corresponding monetary payment (in £).
Please then wait for further instructions from the experimenter, who will pay you in cash before you
leave. While waiting, please complete the receipt form which you will also find on your desk. We need these
receipts for our own accounts.
The results from this experiment will be used solely for academic research. Participants will remain
completely anonymous in any publications connected with this experiment.
Thank you for participating. We hope that you enjoy the experiment, and that you will be willing to
participate again in our future experiments.
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7.2 Test (Two-way; Direct Method)
After reading the instructions you will be asked to complete this brief test, to ensure you have understood
them, before starting the experiment itself.
You may look again at the instructions while answering these questions.
For questions 1− 4, write the answers in the corresponding boxes.
1. If you choose Y and your counterpart chooses X, how many points do you earn in that round?
2. Suppose your value is 0.90; if you announce 0.65 and choose X and your counterpart announces 0.65
and chooses Y , how many points do you earn in that round?
3. Suppose you are Player 1 and your value is 0.65; if you announce 0.90 and choose Y and your
counterpart also chooses Y , how many points do you earn in that round?
4. If over the 20 rounds you accumulate a total of 10.65 points, what is your final cash payment (in £)
for the experiment?
For questions 5− 8, circle either True or False.
5. Your counterpart is the same person in each round. True / False
6. If the value for you is 0.65, then your counterpart’s value must be 0.65. True / False
7. Suppose you are Player 1; whatever the true and announced values are, you always get more points
when both of you choose the same than different. True / False
8. In any publications arising from this experiment the participants will be completely anonymous. True
/ False
Thank you for completing this test. Please leave this completed sheet face up on your desk.
The experimenter will come round to check that you have the correct answers. If any of your answers
are incorrect then the experimenter will give you some explanatory feedback.
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7.3 Record Sheet (Two-way; Direct Method)
Use of this sheet is optional. It is provided so that you can keep a record of the results in each round, as
reported on your computer screen at the end of the round. This may be useful to you in considering your
decisions in subsequent rounds.
You have been assigned the role of the Player (circle one): 1 2
In each cell in the table below, simply circle the correct value as appropriate, while the information is
still on your screen at the end of that round, before clicking Continue.
Round My Value Announce Choice C’part’s Value Announce Choice My Point
1 0.65 0.90 0.65 0.90 X Y 0.65 0.90 0.65 0.90 X Y
2 0.65 0.90 0.65 0.90 X Y 0.65 0.90 0.65 0.90 X Y
3 0.65 0.90 0.65 0.90 X Y 0.65 0.90 0.65 0.90 X Y
4 0.65 0.90 0.65 0.90 X Y 0.65 0.90 0.65 0.90 X Y
5 0.65 0.90 0.65 0.90 X Y 0.65 0.90 0.65 0.90 X Y
6 0.65 0.90 0.65 0.90 X Y 0.65 0.90 0.65 0.90 X Y
7 0.65 0.90 0.65 0.90 X Y 0.65 0.90 0.65 0.90 X Y
8 0.65 0.90 0.65 0.90 X Y 0.65 0.90 0.65 0.90 X Y
9 0.65 0.90 0.65 0.90 X Y 0.65 0.90 0.65 0.90 X Y
10 0.65 0.90 0.65 0.90 X Y 0.65 0.90 0.65 0.90 X Y
11 0.65 0.90 0.65 0.90 X Y 0.65 0.90 0.65 0.90 X Y
12 0.65 0.90 0.65 0.90 X Y 0.65 0.90 0.65 0.90 X Y
13 0.65 0.90 0.65 0.90 X Y 0.65 0.90 0.65 0.90 X Y
14 0.65 0.90 0.65 0.90 X Y 0.65 0.90 0.65 0.90 X Y
15 0.65 0.90 0.65 0.90 X Y 0.65 0.90 0.65 0.90 X Y
16 0.65 0.90 0.65 0.90 X Y 0.65 0.90 0.65 0.90 X Y
17 0.65 0.90 0.65 0.90 X Y 0.65 0.90 0.65 0.90 X Y
18 0.65 0.90 0.65 0.90 X Y 0.65 0.90 0.65 0.90 X Y
19 0.65 0.90 0.65 0.90 X Y 0.65 0.90 0.65 0.90 X Y
20 0.65 0.90 0.65 0.90 X Y 0.65 0.90 0.65 0.90 X Y
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7.4 Instructions (Two-way; Strategy Method)
All participants in this session have the following identical instructions.
Welcome to this experiment, and thank you for participating. Please read the instructions carefully. If
you have any questions or concerns, please raise your hand and the experimenter will come to answer your
question in private. From now onwards please do not talk to any other participants until the experiment
is finished. After you read these instructions we will start our experiment but before you take your actual
decisions we will ask you to complete a brief test in the computer screen.
YOUR DECISION PROBLEM
In this experiment you are asked to make choices in 20 successive rounds. In each round, you earn
a number of points as described later. The total number of points you accumulate over the 20 rounds
determines your final monetary payment, at a conversion rate of 1 point = £1 (= 100 pence); additionally,
you will earn £5 as a fixed show-up fee. The amount you make will be paid to you in cash at the end of the
experiment.
At the start of the first round, the computer randomly assigns you the role of either Player 1 or Player 2.
You keep this same role throughout all 20 rounds. At the beginning of each round you are randomly paired
with another participant (of different role) and neither of you will know the identity of your counterpart
throughout the experiment.
In each round, you and your counterpart (the person are paired with) will be asked to make announcement
decisions in two situations and will face 8 different situations in each of which you have to choose one of two
alternatives, X or Y . Please note that you and your counterpart will make your decisions independently of
each other. So at the moment you make your own choice, you do not know the choice of the other player.
YOUR POINTS
The two players’ choices together determine the points you each earn from that round, as described in
the following table.
Player 2’s Choice
Player 1’s Choice
X Y
X 1, B 0, 0
Y 0, 0 A, 1
The first number in each cell indicates the points earned by Player 1, and the second number indicates
the points earned by Player 2. Number A represents Player 1’s value, similarly number B represents Player
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2’s value. Both the values A and B are either 0.65 or 0.90. The probability of the low value (0.65) is 60%
while the probably of the high value (0.90) is 40%, and the probabilities for A and B are generated randomly
and independently. In other words, the probability of A being 0.65 or 0.90 does not influence the probability
of B being equal to 0.65 or 0.90 and vice versa.
The interpretation of the table is as follows:
If in some round, the choices made by the two players are different (XY or Y X), then both players get
0.
If in some round, both players choose X, from that round Player 1 will earn 1 point (£1) while Player 2
will earn the value of B; that is, either 0.65 (65p) or 0.90 (90p).
If in some round both players choose Y , from that round Player 2 will earn 1 point (£1) while Player 1
will earn the value of A; that is, either 0.65 (65p) or 0.90 (90p).
YOUR DECISIONS
PART 1: YOUR CONDITIONAL ANNOUNCEMENTS
In each round, both you and your counterpart will be asked to make conditional announcements regarding
your respective values of A and B. Each of you has two alternative values to announce (0.65 or 0.90) for the
two possible situations shown in Table 1 below.
Table 1
Situation Your value What do you announce?
1 0.65 0.65 or 0.90
2 0.90 0.65 or 0.90
For example, if you are assigned the role of Player 1, in situation 1 you are informed that A = 0.65, and
you decide what to announce (0.65 or 0.90), whereas in situation 2, you are informed that A = 0.90, and
again decide your announcement. On the other hand, if you are assigned the role of Player 2, in situation
1 you are informed that B = 0.65, and you decide what to announce (0.65 or 0.90), whereas in situation 2,
you are informed that B = 0.90, and decide your announcement.
It is entirely up to you, in any round, whether or not to announce your true value in either situation.
Your and your counterpart’s conditional announcement decisions in this part will determine a situation in
Table 2 in Part 2. The points that you will earn depend only on the choices made and your value for that
situation, as described in the previous page, irrespective of the announcements.
PART 2: YOUR CONDITIONAL CHOICES
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In each round, you and your counterpart will be asked to make conditional choices for 8 situations as
shown in Table 2 below. In Table 2, column 1 represents the number of the situation. Column 2 shows your
value (that is, the value of A if you are assigned to be Player 1, and the value of B if you are Player 2).
Columns 3 and 4 show respectively, your and your counterpart’s announcements. Finally, column 5 is where
you choose X or Y for each situation.
Table 2
Situation Your value Your announcement C’part’s announcement What do you choose?
1 0.65 0.65 0.65 X or Y
2 0.65 0.65 0.90 X or Y
3 0.65 0.90 0.65 X or Y
4 0.65 0.90 0.90 X or Y
5 0.90 0.65 0.65 X or Y
6 0.90 0.65 0.90 X or Y
7 0.90 0.90 0.65 X or Y
8 0.90 0.90 0.90 X or Y
For example, for situation 1, you will have to choose X or Y given that your value (A for Player 1 and
B for Player 2) is equal to 0.65, you announced your value to be 0.65, and you received an announcement
that your counterpart’s value is also 0.65.
On the other hand, for situation 5, you have to choose X or Y given that your value (A for Player 1 and
B for Player 2) is 0.90 but you announced your value to be 0.65 and you received an announcement of 0.65
from your counterpart.
YOUR EARNINGS
In each round, once you and your counterpart have made all the conditional decisions in parts 1 and 2,
the values of A and B are randomly and independently generated by the computer, with the probability of
the low value (0.65) being 60% and the probability of the high value (0.90) being 40%.
Given the realized values of A and B, and your and your counterpart’s announcements from Table 1,
one of the 8 situations in Table 2 is identified. Your and your counterpart’s choices of X and Y in the
corresponding situation will then determine your points.
AT THE END OF THE EXPERIMENT
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When all 20 rounds have been completed, you will be asked to complete a brief onscreen questionnaire,
which provides useful supplementary (anonymous) information for us.
Having completed the questionnaire, you will see a final screen reporting your total points accumulated
over the 20 rounds and the corresponding monetary payment including your show-up fee (in £).
Please then wait for further instructions from the experimenter, who will pay you in cash before you
leave. While waiting, please complete the receipt form provided in your computer screens. We need these
receipts for our own accounts.
The results from this experiment will be used solely for academic research. Participants will remain
completely anonymous in any publications connected with this experiment.
Thank you for participating. We hope that you enjoyed the experiment, and that you will be willing to
participate again in our future experiments.
44
8 REFERENCES
1. Anbarci, N., N. Feltovich and M. Y. Gurdal (2017), “Payoff inequity reduces the effectiveness of
correlated-equilibrium recommendations,” Mimeo.
2. Atwater, L. E. and D. Waldman (1998), “360 degree feedback and leadership development,” The
Leadership Quarterly, 9(4), 423-426.
3. Aumann, R. J. (1974), “Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies,” Journal of Mathemat-
ical Economics, 1(1), 67-96.
4. Aumann, R. J. (1987), “Correlated equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian rationality,” Econometrica,
55(1), 1-18.
5. Blume, A., D. V. DeJong, Y. G. Kim and G. B. Sprinkle (1998), “Experimental evidence on the
evolution of meaning of messages in sender-receiver games,” American Economic Review, 88(5), 1323-
1340.
6. Blume, A., D. V. DeJong, Y. G. Kim and G. B. Sprinkle (2001), “Evolution of communication with
partial common interest,” Games and Economic Behavior, 37(1), 79-120.
7. Bone, J., M. Drouvelis and I. Ray (2013), “Coordination in 2X2 Games by following recommendations
from correlated equilibria.” Discussion Papers, 13-04 (12-04R), Department of Economics, University
of Birmingham.
8. Burton, A., G. Loomes and M. Sefton (2005), “Communication and efficiency in coordination game
experiments,” in J. Morgan (ed.), Experimental and Behavioral Economics, Volume 13 of Advances in
Applied Macroeconomics, JAI Press, 63-85.
9. Cabrales, A., F. Feri, P. Gottardi and M. A. Mele´ndez-Jime´nez (2016), “Can there be a market for
cheap-talk information? Some experimental evidence,” CEPR Discussion Papers, No. 11206.
10. Cabrales, A., W. Garc´ıa-Fontes and M. Motta (2000), “Risk dominance selects the leader: an experi-
mental analysis,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 18(1), 137-162.
11. Cabrales, A., R. Nagel and R. Armenter (2007), “Equilibrium selection through incomplete information
in coordination games: an experimental study,” Experimental Economics, 10(3), 221-234.
12. Cai, H. and J. T. Y. Wang (2006), “Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games,”
Games and Economic Behavior, 56(1), 7-36.
45
13. Carlsson, H. and E. Van Damme (1993), “Global games and equilibrium selection,” Econometrica,
61(5), 989-1018.
14. Cason, T. N. and T. Sharma (2007), “Recommended play and correlated equilibria,” Economic Theory,
33(1), 11-27.
15. Colman, A. M. and M. Bacharach (1997), “Payoff dominance and the Stackelberg heuristic,” Theory
and Decision, 43(1), 1-19.
16. Cooper, R. and A. John (1988), “Coordinating coordination failures in Keynesian models,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 103(3), 441-463.
17. Cooper, R., D. V. DeJong, R. Forsythe and T. W. Ross (1989), “Communication in the battle of the
sexes game: some experimental results,” Rand Journal of Economics, 20(4), 568-587.
18. Costa-Gomes M. (2002), “A suggested interpretation of some experimental results on preplay commu-
nication,” Journal of Economic Theory, 104(1), 104-136.
19. Crawford, V. P. (1998), “A survey of experiments on communication via cheap talk,” Journal of
Economic Theory, 78(2), 286-298.
20. Crawford, V. P. and J. Sobel (1982), “Strategic information transmission,” Econometrica, 50(6), 1431-
1451.
21. Dickhaut, J. W., K. A. McCabe and A. Mukherji (1995), “An experimental study of strategic infor-
mation transmission,” Economic Theory, 6(3), 389-403.
22. Duffy, J. and N. Feltovich (2010), “Correlated equilibria good and bad: an experimental study,”
International Economic Review, 51(3), 701-721.
23. Duffy, J. and E. Fisher (2005), “Sunspots in the laboratory,” American Economic Review, 95(3), 510-
529.
24. Duffy, J., E. K. Lai and W. Lim (2017), “Coordination via correlation: an experimental study,”
Economic Theory, 64(2), 265-304.
25. Eisenberg, E. M. and M. G. Witten (1987), “Reconsidering openness in organizational communication,”
Academy of Management Review, 12(3), 418-426.
26. Farrell, J. (1987), “Cheap talk, coordination and entry,” Rand Journal of Economics, 18(1), 34-39.
27. Fischbacher, U. (2007), “z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments,” Experimental
Economics, 10(2), 171-178.
46
28. Ganguly, C. and I. Ray (2017), “Information-revelation and coordination using cheap talk in a game
with two-sided private information,” Discussion Paper Series, Number 35, CRETA, Department of
Economics, University of Warwick.
29. Georgalos, K., I. Ray and S. Sen Gupta (2017), “Coarse correlation and coordination in a game: an
experiment,” Economics Working Paper Series, 2017/003, Lancaster University Management School,
Lancaster University.
30. Greiner, B. (2015), “Subject pool recruitment procedures: organizing experiments with ORSEE,”
Journal of the Economic Science Association, 1, 114-125.
31. Harsanyi, J. C. and R. Selten (1988), A general theory of equilibrium selection in games, MIT Press.
32. Heinemann, F., R. Nagel and P. Ockenfels (2004), “The theory of global games on test: experimental
analysis of coordination games with public and private information,” Econometrica, 72(5), 1583-1599.
33. Kawagoe, T. and H. Takizawa (1999), “Instability of babbling equilibrium in cheap talk games,” Mimeo.
34. Kawagoe, T. and H. Takizawa (2005), “Why lying pays: truth bias in the communication with con-
flicting interests,” Mimeo.
35. Marimon, R. and S. Sunder (1993), “Indeterminacy of equilibria in a hyperinflationary world: experi-
mental evidence,” Econometrica, 61(5), 1073-1107.
36. McCabe, K. A., A. Mukherji and D. E. Runkle (2000), “An experimental study of information and
mixed-strategy play in the three-person matching-pennies game,” Economic Theory, 15(2), 421-462.
37. McKelvey, R. and T. Page (1990), “Public and private information: an experimental study of infor-
mation pooling,” Econometrica, 58(6), 1321-1339.
38. Moreno, D. and J. Wooders (1998), “An experimental study of communication and coordination in
noncooperative games,” Games and Economic Behavior, 24(1-2), 47-76.
39. Morris, S. and H. S. Shin (1998), “Unique equilibrium in a model of self-fulfilling currency attacks,”
American Economic Review, 88(3), 587-597.
40. Morsing, M. and M. Schultz (2006), “Corporate social responsibility communication: stakeholder in-
formation, response and involvement strategies,” Business Ethics: A European Review, 15(4), 323-338.
41. Sa´nchez-Page´s, S. and M. Vorsatz (2007), “An experimental study of truth-telling in a sender-receiver
game,” Games and Economic Behavior, 61(1), 86-112.
47
42. Scholes, E. and D. Clutterbuck (1998), “Communication with stakeholders: an integrated approach,”
Long Range Planning, 31(2), 227-238.
43. Smidts, A., A. T. H. Pruyn and C. B. Van Riel (2001), “The impact of employee communication and
perceived external prestige on organizational identification,” Academy of Management Journal, 44(5),
1051-1062.
44. Straub, P. G. (1995), “Risk dominance and coordination failures in static games,” Quarterly Review
of Economics and Finance, 35(4), 339-363.
45. Van Huyck, J. B., R. C. Battalio and R. O. Beil (1991), “Strategic uncertainty, equilibrium selection,
and coordination failure in average opinion games,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(3), 885-910.
46. Wang, J. T. Y., M. Spezio and C. F. Camerer (2010), “Pinocchio’s pupil: using eyetracking and pupil
dilation to understand truth telling and deception in sender-receiver games,” American Economic
Review, 100(3), 984-1007.
47. Wilson, R. K. and J. Sell (1997), “‘Liar, liar...’: cheap talk and reputation in repeated public goods
settings,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41(5), 695-717.
48. Yammarino, F. J. and L. E. Atwater (1997), “Do managers see themselves as other see them? Impli-
cations of self-other rating agreement for human resources management,” Organizational Dynamics,
25(4), 35-44.
48
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
